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Conflict, Territory and the Frontier
Economy: Smuggling in the Alps of
Dauphiné During the 18th Century 
Anne Montenach
Translation : Caroline Mackenzie
1 Historical  and  anthropological research  over  the  past  20  or  30  years  has  strongly
challenged Braudel’s vision of mountain communities as immobile, lacking in history and
situated  “at  the  margin  […]  of  the  great  tides  of  civilisation”  (Braudel,  1949,  p.  12;
Fontaine,  2003;  Albera,  2011).  The high valleys of the Western Alps,  like those of the
Pyrenées, should no longer be seen as dominated and peripheral areas disconnected from
the major commercial routes that crisscross modern Europe. On the contrary, they played
a major role in these vast trading networks and, by their participation in licit and illicit
activities, contributed to the “Ancient Regime’s global economy” (Radeff, 1996). 
2 During the 18th century,  Dauphiné was seen as a “foreign” province (province  réputée
étrangère) located on France’s border with Italian provinces.1 For this reason, it offered
many opportunities for widespread smuggling at many levels, whether as part of a simple
strategy  for  survival,  a  capitalist  enterprise  or  a  trade  war  between  states.  In  this
scenario, the border becomes a paradoxical place that not only obstructs but also permits
the passage of travellers. It is an area that offers resources and disparities. It allows states
to affirm their new political powers, while creating opportunities for circumventing those
very  powers.  At  a  time when the  nation-state  was  particularly  keen to  establish  its
authority,  the  frontier  regions  of  Dauphiné  (France)  and  Piedmont  (Italy)  and,  in
particular, the high valleys of the Briançonnais and Queyras regions with their privileges2
offer an excellent  laboratory for observing territorial,  economic and social  strategies
found in smuggling activities and the wide range of power structures in and around
illegal trade. This article focuses on two specific products, the one heavily taxed (salt) and
the other banned (calicos), both of which were much in demand from consumers in 17th-
and 18th-century Europe.  Here we will  first  study smuggling and smugglers  as  a  key
element in a frontier economy and the need for official border controls and opportunities
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for transgression. Next, we will analyse the significance of “territory” in the development
of illegal trade and the conflicts it generated, which in turn led to the emergence of a new
relationship  between the  State  and mountain  communities.  Finally,  we  will  see  how
conflict  can  become  a  “productive  moment” (Roitman,  2005,  p.  22)  in  the  frontier
economy for both the authorities and the smugglers. 
 
Privilege, prohibition and control of territory 
3 In the high valleys of the Western Alps, the predominant economic activity was animal
husbandry, for which salt was in high demand, leading to the development of a very
active market between the plains and the mountains since the 14th century. In Dauphiné,
as in the rest of the kingdom’s south-eastern region, salt was taxed under the “petite
gabelle”3 system: The Dauphinois inhabitants were required to buy their salt supplies from
an authorised warehouse. In 1715, the Grand Escarton4 was granted the privilege,  which
meant that  salt  could be sold for a  lower price than elsewhere in Dauphiné.  Similar
privileged zones were established throughout the petite gabelle¸ a common practice under
the Ancient Regime where the rule became the exception and exemption led to freedom
from the king’s  power to arbitrate (Hincker,  1971,  p.  25;  Kwass,  2000).  In the Alpine
valleys,  the  conflicts  during  Louis  XIV’s  reign  had  created  great  suffering  for  the
inhabitants,  and  this,  together  with  the  need  to  guarantee  the  loyalty  of  frontier
populations, explains why these privileges were renewed regularly until the fall of the
Ancient Regime. 
4 In view of these circumstances, the Dauphiné mountains offered a particularly favourable
area for faux-saunage5 in the early 18 th century: a rugged landscape and unpredictable
weather that made surveillance difficult;  a relatively poor population governed by an
elite protective of its independence and privileges (Fontaine, 2003); a series of internal
borders between valleys with and without privileges and between France and Savoy, which
was still part of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia; different prices for salt (essential for
daily life and local farming); and a network of roads that linked one valley to another and
flouted political frontiers. 
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Figure 1: Brigades and salt warehouses in the Dauphiné Alps (18th century)
Made by Hubert Proal
5 Although of lesser importance for daily life than salt, Indian calicos were introduced into
Europe during the 16th century. They were very popular with consumers in the 1660s and
1670s and created a new trend in contemporary French society. Thanks to the wide range
of patterns and colours, quality and lightness of fabrics, exotic designs and reasonable
prices, they allowed customers to adapt swiftly to changes in fashion (Lemire, 2011, p. 33
et sq.; Riello, 2013, p. 112-116). Quickly imitated in Europe, Indian calicos soon rivalled the
rich fabrics produced by France’s silk and wool manufacturers, whose position at court
allowed them to take their arguments to the King’s Council:  On 26 October 1686, the
Council decreed an embargo on cotton fabrics “painted in India” and on the printing of
white cotton. Between 1686 and 1759, these prohibitions were reinforced by more than
100 edicts, decrees and declarations. However, consumer demand was so strong that it
encouraged  the  development  of  massive  smuggling  in  the  kingdom’s  terrestrial  and
maritime border areas (Kwass,  2014).  Dauphiné was a particularly attractive area for
smuggling in the 18th century and became the theatre for a black market in banned
calicos. Furthermore, it was close to Geneva, which was rapidly becoming a European hub
for producing cotton fabrics and a clearing-house for imported calicos, and its frontier
with Savoy could be crossed in many places with impunity, all of which contributed to an
endemic increase in smuggling activities. The leading merchants in Lyon, Geneva and
Grenoble sold both authorised merchandise and smuggled calicos and took advantage of
their  social  position  to  ensure  that  the  local  parlementary  elite  overlooked  any
suggestions of misconduct. In the countryside, smuggling operations were in the hands of
large armed gangs, in particular after the 1720s, and the Ferme agents were powerless to
prevent their activities. 
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6 The introduction of the Ferme system and of the petite gabelle in Dauphiné can be seen as
part  of  a  larger  strategy  for  the  extension  of  state  authority  – usually  through  the
consolidation of “national” territory and the installation of frontiers, with Vauban and
Colbert the main instigators (Virol, 2003; Bitterling, 2009) – and for appropriation by the
crown of a proudly independent border province. A number of measures, in particular
those regulating commerce, sought to reinforce the presence and authority of the state in
Dauphiné. The prerogatives of the Grenoble Parlement, champion of provincial liberties,
were  restricted  one  by  one,  a  policy  initiated  by  Richelieu,  through the  creation  of
tribunals for matters relating to the gabelle. In 1691, new courts specifically for hearing
cases on trafficking were established, which further eroded the Parlement’s privilege of
hearing all  criminal  and civil  cases  against  the  rights  of  the  king.  Furthermore,  the
Commission of Valence was established in 1733 in order to act as the court of appeal for
crimes  involving  contraband  (Favier,  2002,  p.  192).  In  addition,  the  salt  warehouses
– which  acted  not  only  as  stores  but  also  as  tribunals  –  and  the  brigades  began  to
personify,  for  the  Dauphiné inhabitants,  the  presence  of  both the  State  and the  tax
regime. 
7 Meanwhile, the Ferme introduced a number of sedentary and mobile brigades to police tax
collection. In the early 1730s, the Intendant for Dauphiné, Gaspard Moïse Augustin de
Fontanieu, reported that the Mountains Surveillance Department had five brigades at its
disposal to control Queyras and the upper valley of the Durance, but he thought this was
insufficient  “to  successfully  supervise  the  many  gorges  through  which  [the  bands]
travel”.6 Two  brigades  located  at  Entre-deux-Guiers  and  Pont-de-Beauvoisin  were
responsible for supervising the frontier with Savoy, which ran along the River Guiers.
This river “can be forded from one end to the other and in all seasons”. A Regiment of
Invalides was garrisoned at Pont-de-Beauvoisin. 
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Figure 2: The River Guiers and the frontier between Dauphiné and Piedmont
Made by Hubert Proal
8 These brigades patrolled the whole territory and would, on occasion, carry out searches.
These were far from popular with the local inhabitants who saw them as a manifestation
of the royal taxation regime. The agents set up ambushes at the crossing points (ridges,
valleys and gorges) used by smugglers, but winter conditions and bad weather made these
missions particularly unpleasant. In these games of cat and mouse, smugglers could easily
change  their  routes  or  trick  the  patrols.  In  May  1736,  a  brigadier  and  two  guards
stationed at La Madeleine were informed that a cargo of untaxed salt would be carried
from Briançon to Oisans. They pretended “to go to the village of Lauzet, as it was Sunday,
and attend mass”, and then “doubled back over the top of the mountain in order to arrive
incognito and ambush us as we entered the privilege zone”.7 
9 Snippets of information gleaned from official reports of searches provide insights into the
daily life and situation in the mountains described by men who were, for the most part,
native to the “country” (Roche, Michaut, 1970, p. 219). These have little in common with
descriptions by travellers for whom the high mountain areas still seemed, in the early
18th  century,  an  “absolute  trial”,  a  “physical,  psychological  and  social  challenge”
(Bourdon, 2011, p. 217), until the “Alpine myth”, an idealisation of the landscape, inspired
more enchantment  than fear  (Reichler,  2002,  p.  239).  Reports  by the brigades  rarely
mention  the  difficulties  of  irregular  terrain,  steep  slopes  or  the  undoubtedly  very
rudimentary –  or  indeed non-existent  –  nature  of  some paths,  though references  to
weather conditions were common. For gabelou (customs officer) and smuggler alike, the
mountains had become a place where the residents felt totally at home, while offering
opportunities for an infinite variety of illegal activities. 
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Playing with space, conflict and negotiation
10 Savoy was a major hub for smuggling both salt and calicos. Geneva merchants established
warehouses full of banned fabrics produced by the local calico workshops or reconsigned
from the sales of Indian trading companies in Lorient, London and Amsterdam. On 21 July
1603, the Duke of Savoy and the Republic of Geneva signed the Treaty of Saint-Julien, in
which they agreed that goods from Geneva could be transported through the Duchy of
Savoy without paying customs dues or taxes. This opened up new opportunities for gangs
of armed smugglers to bring fabrics into France. On 5 January 1355 (Treaty of Paris), the
River Guiers became the 25-kilometre long frontier between Dauphiné and Savoy that
could easily be crossed at any one of the 20 natural fords before it joined the Rhône. In
theory, this border followed the riverbeds of the Guiers and the Rhône, but at periods of
high and low flows its  exact  route  was  difficult  to identify  (Bonnin,  1993,  p.  25).  In
addition, both states laid claim to the entire river bed, which created a new source of
discord throughout this region and requiring heavy surveillance, until the Treaty of Turin
(1760)  established that  the frontier  ran through the middle  of  the  Guiers.  The most
famous of these frontier “incidents” occurred during the night of 10/11 May 1755: The
famous smuggler Mandrin was arrested by 500 soldiers from the La Morlière Regiment
while he was hiding in the Château de Rochefort-en-Novalaise, not far from the Savoy
frontier.8 Strung  along  this  contested  frontier,  the  villages  of  Les  Échelles,  Pont-de-
Beauvoisin and Saint-Genix-sur-Guiers  regularly gave shelter  to important  merchants
involved in illicit trade.9
11 Contraband salt  also  travelled  from Savoy  through Dauphiné’s  mountainous  regions.
Trade in Peccais salt10 between France and Savoy was authorised by a treaty between King
Philip VI of France and Count Aymon of Savoy in 1335 (Bergier, 1982, p. 183; Le Goff,
1960).  In the 16th century, this trade was disrupted when Savoy became an enemy of
France,  but  by  the  17th century  new  regulations  were  introduced  and  regularly
reconfirmed.  Whereas  the  gabelle  system  substantially  raised  the  price  for  French
consumers, Savoyards were able to buy French salt at cost.  Furthermore, the duchy’s
agents, who were responsible for calculating supplies of salt, deliberately overestimated
the figures for inhabitants and livestock, so that 20 to 25% more salt was delivered than
was  required  (Blanchard,  1937).  Excess  supplies  were  smuggled  into  France  and,  in
particular,  Dauphiné.  Complaints  by  the  French  authorities  about  the  practice  of  “
reversement et retour”11 were made throughout the 18th century, particularly because, since
Richelieu’s  day,  each new war  had led to  an increase  in  taxes  on salt,  and salt  had
gradually served as an excuse for war (Hocquet, 1984, p. 341): Between 1700 and 1706
alone,12 the Grenoble Parlement found 190 men – mostly from Dauphiné – guilty of faux-
saunage (Bonnin, 2001, p. 113). It was not until the Constituent Assembly13 decided in 1790
to halve the price of salt that this trend was reversed with more salt being smuggled out
of France to Savoy. 
12 While the region around the River Guiers was the smugglers’ preferred area of activity,
the Valley of La Maurienne offered an alternative route to Oisans by crossing numerous
passes. Farther south, they brought salt in from Piedmont, taking advantage of variations
in price on the one or the other side of the frontier. The Treaty of Utrecht, which took
Oulx, Val Cluson and Château-Dauphin out of the Grand Escarton, did not put an end to the
centuries-old trade between the valleys.14 These border territories had their own concept
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of time and were indifferent to political decisions that transformed what was once legal
merchandise into contraband and, as a result, practices in these outlying areas were often
out of kilter with political and administrative regulations. 
13 From a wider perspective,  the tax-free zones of  Briançon and Queyras became major
centres  for  smuggling  after  1715,  despite  the  presence  of  Ferme brigades.  Smugglers
extended their territory into areas that could never be supervised by a few men, no
matter how well they were positioned. This raised the question whether the Ferme and
the  central  government  were  really  committed  to  fighting  a  relatively  wide-ranging
smuggling network. These smugglers were in fact less violent and dangerous than the
gangs operating along the Guiers, a region where the landscape and weather conditions
were  more  effective  at  limiting  the  activities  of  criminals.  Fontanieu,  who was  very
knowledgeable about his province, was not fooled: On the contrary, he thought that “we
will never succeed in stamping out” smuggling in Dauphiné and added that it was “being
encouraged by nature in such a mountainous region” (Dubois, 1932, p. 183).
14 Fontanieu’s correspondence and reports to the Controller General and the Intendants of
Finances, as well as his memoirs, described the Guiers Valley as a source of violent and
repeated smuggling activities that were difficult to control even with armed agents as the
smugglers were aided by both the province’s inhabitants and its parlement. The large
gangs that sometimes harassed the region during his period of office were followed, in
the 1750s, by armed bands led by Mandrin and other more or less famous leaders. During
the 18th century, these smuggling networks were gradually reorganised into large well-
structured troops covering a wide area in all the frontier regions (Ferrer, 1998, p. 90).
They were particularly feared by the authorities because many of their members were
deserters who “had served [in the armies]”15 of France, Savoy and Piedmont and “were
hired by gang leaders at a fixed rate per voyage”.16 These men had no compunction in
attacking or even killing Ferme agents. In his memoirs, François Flandrin, Captain General
of the Fermes in Voiron, describes 32 repression campaigns during the period 1750-1782:
He was shot four times, while three agents and two smugglers died during these missions
(Flandrin, Favier, 2009). The use of violence, for which the perpetrators were regularly
sentenced  to  death,  also  explained  how  the  gangs  received  assistance  from  the
“countryside”; “what the smugglers cannot have with inducements”, wrote Fontanieu to
Fagon in December 1724, “they obtain by fear and threats, which they spread and carry
out, of burning and looting against anyone who dares to stand against them or helps to
hinder them”.17 
15 Nevertheless, smuggling should not be interpreted uniquely in terms of resistance to the
tax  regime  and  its  territorial  construction,  as  in  the  case  of  the  “salt  wars”  in  the
Pyrenées  (Ayats,  2002,  p.  258-262).  As  a  source  of  revenue  for  the  local  population,
smuggled goods, and particularly calicos, were a key factor in the commercial practices of
important merchants who engaged in licit and illicit trading. With regard to dealings
between  mountain  communities  and  the  State,  smuggling  was  a  key  factor  in  the
negotiations for maintaining salt privileges throughout the 18th century, which appears to
be a way of avoiding open conflict. In a “massively incorporated world”, to use Jacques
Revel’s words, the Grand Escarton’s 19 communities in the Briançon and Queyras districts
banded  together  and  signed  trading  agreements  with  the  State  offering  a  collective
service – their loyalty to the crown and defence of the frontier – in return for a collective
privilege – a low tariff for salt (Revel, 1987, p. 226-227). In these negotiations, solliciteurs18
and  other  intermediaries  played  a  key  role,  as  did  the  networks  of  patronage  or
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clientelism  through  institutionalised  lobbying.19 The  Grand  Escarton and  its  Parisian
lawyers acted as a pressure group working both as a body – as understood under the
Ancient Regime – and as an organisation (or,  in Douglass North’s words,  a “group of
players”) within  this  institution  –  or  game  plan –  that  is  lobbying  (North,  1990).
Throughout the negotiations, the question of contraband was ever-present, as a threat or
as an ultimatum, but it never served as an excuse for not renewing the privilege. In total,
the enormous sums paid by the Grand Escarton (nearly 40,000 livres between 1721 and
1738) could be seen as regular payments for the right to smuggle, which was implicitly
tolerated by the elite and the State as a means of, and as a guarantee for, the loyalty of
the  inhabitants  in  the  frontier  region  and  for  high  sales  of  salt  from  the  privilege 
warehouses. 
 
Conflict as a “productive moment”
16 In  order  to  control  or,  on  the  contrary,  circumvent  the  frontier,  those  involved  in
contraband or its repression used a variety of tactics – which turned their conflicts into
“productive  moments”  (Roitman,  2005)  –  as  a  source  of  innovative  practices  for
controlling territory and protecting illicit trade. In the case of contraband calicos, the
decision to set up a network of Ferme brigades and control posts in the frontier provinces
was soon revealed as quite inadequate for preventing the passage of large bands of armed
smugglers on horseback. Campaigns to counter smuggling soon took on the appearance
of out-and-out war, pitting the rural police force and royal troops against smugglers who
were often more brigands than traders. 
17 Intendant Fontanieu’s  correspondence and memoirs  are a  rich source of  information
about how armed campaigns were used to combat illegal contraband between 1724 and
1738. Upon his arrival in Dauphiné in 1724, he was faced with the problem of smuggling.
Realising the importance of safeguarding the frontier with Savoy, he initially decided on a
campaign of repression against the purveyors of contraband: Although still not prepared
to engage in war or the use of force, he nevertheless decided to “disrupt the commerce of
traders”,  the principal  clients for banned merchandise,  “by [threatening] long prison
terms  and  [undertaking]  rigorous  investigations”  and  arresting  gang  leaders.20 An
important element in this campaign was the Alpine valleys. While in no way comparable
to  the  high  mountains  around  Briançon,  they  nevertheless  remained  very  rugged.
Fontanieu made several references to these obstacles: It was impossible, he wrote as early
as 1725, to hope to “crush [the smugglers] entirely” … “in such mountainous and difficult
country”.21 “[I]mpassable  in  winter”  for  soldiers, 22 the  mountains  were  accessible  in
summer by “paths” known only to the local population, and “it would require an entire
army to control all the passes and gorges”.23 The analogy, or indeed the homology, of
savage mountain landscape – “the nature of the countryside that cannot be defended” –
and its habitants, long seen by town dwellers (administrators and intellectuals alike) as
violent and averse to social order, was implicit (Walter, 2004, p. 49; Debarbieux, Rudaz,
2010,  p.  36-37):  “what  could  we  do”,  wrote  Fontanieu,  “with  a  few  companies  of
grenadiers who are mocked by the locals as they climb the steep, craggy slopes”?24  
18 The first breakthrough came in the summer of 1732. At the time, the killing of two Ferme 
agents by the gang headed by Jean Barret, which operated in the area between Savoy and
Vivarais, forced Fontanieu to accept that armed retaliation was now necessary – he uses
the word “war” many times in his  correspondence.  Realising that Ferme agents were
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powerless  and that  it  was  “impossible  to  place troops in every mountain gorge”,  he
submitted a proposal for the supervision of river valleys by soldiers to the Controller
General.25 As a tactician, he argued that the province’s hinterland could be patrolled by a
combination of infantry and dragoons (foot soldiers on horseback) to be deployed as
dictated by the landscape.26 In addition, Fontanieu thought it was important to ask for
more troops from the Intendants of neighbouring provinces and the King of Piedmont,
who finally agreed to send soldiers.27 The second breakthrough came in 1738, when the
armed gangs again stepped up their activities in Dauphiné. Drawing on his 15 years of
experience in using armed force against smugglers, he submitted a report to Controller
General  Orry  in  which  he  expressed  his  disillusionment  with  the  efficacy  of  Ferme
brigades and royal troops in combatting armed gangs. He put forward a new proposal
that once again described the specific geographical features of his province. Dauphiné
being surrounded, he wrote, “on almost all sides by the Alpine high country, we should
not fool ourselves into thinking that smuggling can be prevented by guard posts, because
there are so many ways of crossing the mountains, and these are better known to the
smugglers than to our agents; as a result, the smugglers have the ability to change paths
for more inaccessible routes at any moment in their journey”.28 He suggested that the
Ferme set up cavalry brigades composed of two companies of 50 dragoons to operate not
along the frontier but in the province’s hinterland. Meanwhile, the Ferme offices would be
staffed by agents authorised to receive taxes and a handful of soldiers who were “to avoid
any unequal resistance” for their own safety.29 After having sought,  in vain,  to make
Dauphiné’s river and road frontiers impenetrable during the early years of his mission,
Fontanieu  noted that  “there  is  no  way that  we  can hope  to  eliminate  smuggling  in
Dauphiné by placing agents at the frontier posts.”30 No action was taken on his proposals. 
19 Through the introduction of  prohibition and frontier controls,  the State sought,  to a
certain  extent,  to  implement  Colbert’s  policy  for  “territorialising”  commerce.  This
initiative was never likely  to  succeed because the kingdom under Louis  XIV and his
ministers and the trading area of smugglers and their merchant clients did not cover the
same territory (Salvemini,  Zaugg,  2013,  p. 316).  Aware of  the risk of  raids,  smugglers
demonstrated their skill in finding new solutions by introducing an insurance system. In
1724, Fontanieu reported that in Dauphiné there were “several gang leaders in league
with merchants wishing to trade in smuggled goods; they negotiated agreements based
on the value of the goods to be carried from the frontier to their destination”.31 A few
years later, he was able to give more details: “the more the smugglers’ activities were
disrupted, the higher the cost of insurance”.32 For these “indemnified contrabandists”,
the profits were commensurate with the financial risks involved in the event of raids,
which would explain the violence in their skirmishes with Ferme agents. This practice,
which  compensated  the  merchants  for  their  losses,  also  showed that  the  clients  for
contraband  merchandise  did  not  hesitate,  particularly  when  they  had  a  legitimate
business, to make use of the traditional tools of legal trade to protect their commerce. 
20 In conclusion, there remains a last “innovation” in this struggle against smuggling, in
addition to arguments in favour of repression and repeated publication of the rules, in
the  accommodations  that  can  be  found  in  court  reports.  Although  gangs  of  armed
smugglers were certainly involved in criminal acts and were subjected to heavy penalties,
illegal  trading  by  small-time  faux-sauniers and  by  the  city  merchants  should  also  be
considered as part of their diversified daily activities. The participation of women who
were usually punished less severely offered more original and widespread opportunities
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for handling legal  and illegal  merchandise for which consumer demand was growing
throughout  the  18th century.  Because  it  took  advantage  of  France’s  fragmented  tax
system and of embargos on imported merchandise, smuggling offered yet another way of
exploiting – and implicitly confirming the need for the presence of – mountain frontiers,
while simultaneously providing alternative options in an excessively regulated market
(Clemente,  2013,  p.  359).  Oscillating  between  privilege and  smuggling,  conflicts  and
circumventions, these illegal practices should not be interpreted uniquely as a form of
dissidence  or  rejection  of  the State.  As  so  aptly  stated  by  Serge  Brunet, such  an
interpretation echoes “Braudel’s fixité (immobility)”, which ignores all opportunities for
negotiation (Brunet, 2007, p. 53). 
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NOTES
1. This term is used by France’s customs regime during the late 17th and 18th centuries. ‘Foreign’
provinces  (provinces  réputées  étrangères:  Artois,  Brittany,  Flanders,  Guyenne,  Saintonge,
Languedoc,  Provence,  Dauphiné,  Lyonnais)  were  not  included  in  the  customs  tariff  system
established in 1664. Trade between these provinces and the unified customs area known as the
five “Grandes Fermes” (the dozen provinces located in the northern core of the kingdom) was
subjected to import and export taxes.
2. The privilege was a right or a form of tax relief on specific products that was granted to various
towns and regions – Translator’s note. 
3. The gabelle was a tax on salt,  for which the King held a monopoly. French provinces were
divided into several groups that paid different rates for the salt tax. The grande gabelle covered
mostly the northern core of the kingdom. In this zone, the salt tax was high, and the crown
authorities fixed the amount of salt that the inhabitants were required to buy. In the petite gabelle
regions, salt was moderately taxed, and there was no legal obligation to buy a fixed allotment of
salt. 
4. This was a group of two communities (escartons) of Briançon and Queyras. 
5. The term was used only for smugglers of salt. 
6. Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF), Ms fr. 8360: Memoirs on the King’s Fermes in Dauphiné,
collected by M. de Fontanieu, v. 1731, f° 67 r°. 
7. Archives départementales des Hautes Alpes, B 330, 27 May 1736. 
8. Archives départementales de Savoie, 2 B 12148, 1755 ; Archivio di Stato di Torino, Paesi, Savoie,
Incidenti con la Francia, Mazzo 1, n° 9, 1754-1756. 
9. See Figure 2. 
10. Developed in the 13th century, these salt flats lie along the Languedoc coast, 2 kilometres
from Aigues-Mortes. 
11. I.e. buying cheap in Savoy and selling again in France for a profit.
12. I.e. during the early years of the War of Spanish Succession.
13. The Constituent Assembly was the French national assembly when the French Revolution
broke out in 1789. 
14. This refers to the five valleys of Briançon, Queyras, Oulx, Val Cluson and Château-Dauphin,
known  as  the  Grand  Escarton.  Its  assembly  had  the  power  to  manage  their  tax,  miliary  and
political affairs. See Figure 1. 
15. BNF, Ms fr. 8382: Replies to letters from the Contrôleur General and the Intendants des finances, 1
June 1725, f° 96 r°. 
16. BNF, Ms fr. 8390, 17 July 1732, f° 111 v°. 
17. BNF, Ms fr. 8381, 7 December 1724, f° 72 v°-73 r°.  
18. Influential  men at  court  whose  objective  was  to  influence royal  policy  –  now known as
lobbyists. 
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19. Although  anachronistic,  this  term  well  describes  how  communities  worked  together,  by
repeatedly paying large sums and maintaining representatives at the court, to preserve their
privileges and influence royal power. 
20. BNF, Ms fr. 8381, 7 December 1724, f° 132 r°.. 
21. BNF, Ms fr. 8383, 30 October 1725, f° 141 v°. 
22. BNF, Ms fr. 8387, 13 October 1729, f° 142 r°. 
23. BNF, Ms fr. 8389, 27 March 1732, f° 291 v°. 
24. BNF, Ms fr. 8387, 13 October 1729, f° 141 r°.
25. BNF, Ms fr. 8390, 6 July 1732, f° 93 r°. 
26. BNF, Ms fr. 8390, 17 July 1732, f° 109 r° ; 24 juillet 1732, f° 118 v°.
27. BNF, Ms fr. 8390, 30 October 1732, f° 222 r°. 
28. BNF, Ms fr. 8392, 28 August 1738, f° 325 r°. 
29. Ibidem, f° 326 v°.
30. Ibidem. 
31. BNF, Ms fr. 8381, 7 December 1724, f° 130 v°. 
32. BNF, Ms fr. 8476: Memoir on smuggling, c. 1732, f° 65 v°-66 r°. 
ABSTRACTS
This article takes up the theme of “mountains and conflict” with a review of smuggling in the
Dauphiné Alps during the 18th century. As a “foreign” and border province, smuggling was rife
in Dauphiné and practised by a variety of inhabitants. For some, it was part of the daily strategy
for survival, for others their normal commercial practice, while for states it became a bargaining
chip in negotiations over trade wars. Paradoxically, the frontier was not only a barrier but also a
passage,  depending on the different scenarios  enacted along its  length:  a  resource,  a  porous
fence, a key place for affirming state power, and an opportunity to circumvent state authority. At
a time when nation-states were seeking to affirm their presence, the frontier between Dauphiné
and Piedmont, and more specifically the border defining the privileges granted to the Briançon
and Queyras districts, offers an excellent opportunity for studying the territorial, economic and
social situations generated by the very presence of frontiers and the various forms of power
relationships involved in or controlling illegal  commerce.  This  article reviews the conditions
surrounding the emergence of a black market in two products, the one heavily taxed (salt) and
the other banned (calicos), both of which were in high demand by European consumers during
the 17th and 18th centuries. 
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